"[London] is a
pioneer of a trend toward video surveillance that is also
sweeping the United States and provoking howls from civil
libertarians whose internal clocks are set to make a
reference to 1984 every 15 minutes or so. Given the
choice, apparently, they would prefer not to have the
video of the July 21 bombers, which is an indication of
the suicidal otherworldliness of ACLU-style civil
libertarianism."
-- Rich
Lowry
As
regular TCS readers know, I am an economist, with no claim
to expertise on terrorism or security. I write on those
subjects as an interested citizen. Based on those
qualifications, I have some points that at first may seem
counterintuitive, but which I believe make sense once you
consider them.
1.
"Homegrown" terrorism represents an opportunity
as well as a threat to security.
2.
Security cameras are an inferior surveillance technology.
3.
Screening at potential target sites is an activity with
high costs and low benefits.
4.
The group most in need of intense, systematic scrutiny is
the Department of Homeland Security.
Homegrown
Terrorism is an
Opportunity
Many
people are upset by the fact that some of the
London
bombers were British citizens. If you thought that
terrorism could be prevented by requiring ID cards,
systematically searching for illegal aliens, and deporting
everyone without proper papers, then this might make you
think twice. But I was never in that camp to begin with.
On
the other hand, if you believe that the best way to deal
with terrorism is to infiltrate the terrorist
organizations in order to obtain strategic and tactical
intelligence, then the existence of homegrown terrorism is
an opportunity. It is pretty hard to insinuate a CIA agent
into a clan-based cell located in some remote -stan. But
if terror cells include people who otherwise appear to be
ordinary English-speaking citizens, then infiltration
should be much easier.
Security
Cameras are Inferior Technology
The
ability to recreate a terrorist incident after the fact
does not excite me. It would do nothing to deter a suicide
terrorist. My guess is that it does little to deter even
terrorists who want to live afterward -- they know they
are playing a high-risk game.
As
a prevention tool, security cameras are of questionable
value. Do human beings have to monitor the cameras 24/7?
At best, cameras can use face-recognition technology to
issue some sort of alert, such as, "there's a chap on
our watch list, about to board the subway." Is such
information timely and actionable?
It
seems to me that it would make more sense to invest in a
network of sensors that detects explosive devices than a
network of cameras. A sensor that tries to detect
explosives is less of a threat to privacy than a video
camera. And a positive reading from such a sensor would be
a lot more actionable.
I
am not saying that reliable technology exists to protect
against bombs. However, my instinct is that sensors that
are dedicated to that purpose will accomplish more than
security cameras.
Screening
at Target Sites is Wasteful
The
cost of screening people at airports and subway stations
is enormous. It is not simply the manpower involved in
conducting the screening. The time that people waste while
waiting to get on board is very significant.
The
benefits of this screening are dubious. As everyone knows,
there are plenty of other potential targets. Moreover,
whenever I am stuck in a long line to get through airport
security, I think of what an invitation this provides for
a terrorist who wants to set off a bomb where it would
cause heavy casualties.
I
am pretty sure that any cost-benefit analysis of
"equal-opportunity" screening would reach an
adverse determination. Crude racial profiling would be
just as bad, because terrorists would simply work around
the profiles. The approach that makes the most sense to me
is to search primarily on the basis of the risk
characteristics of the individual, with proximity to a
"potential target" only a secondary factor.
Today, we do it the other way around, which is extremely
cost-inefficient.
Of
course, to focus on high-risk individuals, one needs to
have some sort of database. That raises privacy issues,
and it leads to my final point, which reiterates what I
wrote in The
Constitution of Surveillance.
Scrutinize
DHS
"A
March GAO report said that Secure Flight had not met nine
out of the ten conditions mandated by Congress before TSA
could spend money on implementing the program. (If you
haven't read this report, it's pretty scathing.) The
redress problem -- helping people who cannot fly because
they share a name with a terrorist -- is not getting any
better. And Secure Flight is behind schedule and over
budget.
...It's
also a rogue program that is operating in flagrant
disregard for the law. It can't be killed completely; the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
mandates that TSA implement a program of passenger
prescreening. And until we have Secure Flight, airlines
will still be matching passenger names with terrorist
watch lists under the CAPPS-I program. But it needs some
serious public scrutiny."
-- Bruce
Schneier
What
is our most important security priority? What needs to be
watched most closely? Our airports? Our rail systems? Our
government buildings? Our borders? Radical Muslims?
I
think that the top security priority should be to set up a
system to monitor the Department of Homeland Security. I
am not kidding.
We
should have an agency whose sole function is to audit the
conduct and performance of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) that is tasked with preventing terrorism.
This audit agency should be:
--
independent, with its own budget and a clear, specific
mission, to examine DHS policies, procedures, and internal
controls.
--
authorized to shut down programs that fail to enhance
security or are misused or abused by DHS.
--
able to affect the performance evaluations and
compensation of top management at DHS.
There
are two risks that I worry about with DHS. One risk is
that they will infringe on the dignity and rights of
ordinary citizens. The other risk is that they will do an
ineffective job at preventing terrorism. A strong watchdog
would ease my concerns about both of those risks.
Arnold
Kling is author of Learning
Economics.
